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Abstract
We analyse exchange rate pass-through into import prices for a large group of 33 emerg-
ing and developed economies from 1980Q1 to 2010Q4. Our error correction models permit
asymmetric pass-through for currency appreciations and depreciations over three horizons
of interest: on impact, in the short run and in the long run. We find that depreciations
are typically passed-through more strongly than appreciations in the long-run, suggesting
that exporters may exert a degree of long-run pricing power. This asymmetry is stronger
in economies which are more import dependent but is moderated by freedom to trade and
a positive output gap. Given that this pass-through asymmetry is welfare-reducing for con-
sumers in the destination market, a key macroeconomic implication is that import-dependent
economies, in particular, can benefit from trade liberalisation.
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1 Introduction
A substantial literature has studied the transmission of exchange rate fluctuations into the prices
of internationally-traded goods. Interest in the analysis of exchange rate pass-through (ERPT)
is motivated by its relevance for understanding the likely effects of monetary policy interventions
and its role in informing important debates on the international transmission of economic cycles,
global trade imbalances and the optimality of alternative exchange rate regimes. Two polar cases
are illustrative. First, exporters may exercise pricing power by maintaining the export price fixed
in their own currency as a markup over marginal costs, a strategy known as producer currency
pricing (PCP). In this case, ERPT is complete and the price faced by importing firms in their
local currency will fully reflect exchange rate movements. At the other extreme, the price paid
by importers in their own currency will be insulated from fluctuations in the exchange rate
(zero ERPT) if exporters choose to fully absorb any exchange rate shock within their operating
margins, a strategy known as local currency pricing (LCP). In the context of multiple markets,
LCP typically manifests as ‘pricing-to-market’ behaviour.
Under the assumption of perfectly competitive and frictionless markets, the law of one price
indicates that all exchange rate shocks, irrespective of their size and sign, are rapidly and
completely reflected in import prices. This view is embedded within many New Open-Economy
Macroeconomic models that have informed debates on the optimal conduct of monetary policy
and its welfare implications. However, the evidence suggests that, in practice, exporting firms
often operate in imperfectly competitive markets and that ERPT is sluggish and incomplete.
We study asymmetric ERPT with respect to the direction of exchange rate changes — that
is, appreciation versus depreciation. Throughout the paper, the term appreciation (depreciation)
is used to describe an increase (decrease) in the value of the importer’s local currency versus the
exporter’s currency. Our analysis concentrates on stage one ERPT, that is, pass-through into
import prices ‘at the dock’ or the point of entry into the destination market. Unlike working
with overall ERPT into a broad price index like CPI, our approach obviates the need to control
for confounding factors such as local transportation costs, storage costs and marketing costs.
We make several contributions to the literature, starting with our dataset. We examine a
large unbalanced panel dataset covering 14 emerging markets (EMs) and 19 developed markets
(DMs) over a maximum time period of 1980Q1 to 2010Q4. We are unaware of any prior paper
on directional asymmetry that has considered such a representative cross-section of countries.
The inclusion of many EMs in our sample reflects their growing importance in international
2
trade. The IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics reveals that the proportion of world exports
accounted for by EMs doubled from 1990 to 2010. Furthermore, rather than relying on common
proxies for the foreign export price such as foreign producer price indices (e.g., Bussie`re, 2013;
Marazzi et al., 2005) or foreign headline consumer price indices (e.g., Marazzi and Sheets, 2007),
we construct an effective export price index for each importing country as a trade-weighted
combination of the foreign export prices that it faces.
Our estimation framework also extends the frontier demarcated by the existing literature.
We adopt recent innovations in asymmetric error correction modelling to investigate the presence
of impact, short- and long-run asymmetries in import ERPT. Specifically, in the first stage of our
analysis, we use the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) modelling framework of
Shin et al. (2014) to estimate ERPT elasticities on a country-by-country basis. This methodology
is not without precedent in the literature on overall (or consumer price) ERPT behaviour, where
Delatte and Lopez-Villavicencio (2012) have used NARDL models to study overall ERPT for
a group of four DMs. However, at the time of writing, we are aware of no existing empirical
application to stage one (or import) ERPT.
Having estimated NARDL models for each importing country, we then estimate an array of
panel pass-through models using the Mean Group Estimator proposed by Pesaran and Smith
(1995). This involves identifying desired groups of importing countries and then averaging the
relevant country-specific NARDL parameter estimates to jointly exploit the time and cross-
section variation in the data, thereby achieving more precise estimation and inference. Finally,
we employ cross-sectional regressions in order to relate directional ERPT asymmetry to the
economic characteristics of the importing market.
Our analysis suggests that depreciations are passed-through to import prices more vigorously
than appreciations over the long-run. Interestingly, we observe no clear distinction between EMs
and DMs in this regard, which suggests that the ‘fear of floating’ among many EMs has no basis
in import price ERPT behaviour. We also find a positive link between the extent of the long-
run ERPT asymmetry and import dependence, which is a proxy for import penetration. This
strongly suggests that the pricing decisions of exporting firms are related to the extent of their
market power. However, the link between ERPT asymmetry and import dependence is weaker
for importing economies that enjoy greater trade freedom and/or a positive output gap. The
moderating effect of trade freedom on ERPT asymmetry is consistent with a branch of the
theoretical literature which contends that greater openness enhances market competition (e.g.,
Daniels and VanHoose, 2013; Gust et al., 2010; Kleshchelski and Vincent, 2009). Meanwhile,
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the positive link between long-run ERPT asymmetry and the output gap suggests that exporters
may act to enhance their market share in fast growing economies. The moderating effect of the
output gap on ERPT asymmetry is somewhat consistent with a body of work which argues that
larger market size induces stronger competition (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).
This evidence speaks to policymakers and complements a prolific theoretical and empirical
literature on goods price behaviour. The pattern of asymmetry that we uncover is consistent
with downward nominal rigidity in import prices. To borrow a phrase from Peltzman (2000), the
fact that prices rise faster than they fall adversely affects both realised and expected inflation,
particularly in countries where the share of imports in consumption is large. Such asymmetric
ERPT behaviour impairs the ability of exchange rate changes to correct international trade
imbalances and complicates the conduct of monetary policy. However, our results also yield a
natural policy implication — importing countries may limit the scope for exporters’ rent-seeking
asymmetric ERPT behaviour by promoting greater freedom to trade.
Our paper is closely related to two strands of the ERPT literature. First, there is a the-
oretical literature about the asymmetric response of exporters to appreciations/depreciations.
The capacity constraints theory contends that exporting firms operating at full capacity cannot
accommodate the surge in demand resulting from an appreciation of the importer’s currency.
Thus, exporters may rationally choose to retain appreciations by widening their markups, a
strategy consistent with short-run downward import price stickiness. The market share theory
posits that foreign firms seeking to gain or defend market share may absorb depreciations of the
importer’s currency while passing-through appreciations in order to quote competitive prices
(e.g. Krugman, 1987; Marston, 1990). Naturally, the degree of competition is expected to play a
role as exporters operating in weakly competitive markets may systematically pass-through de-
preciations to preserve their markups (Bussie`re, 2013). Finally, the technology switching model
of Ware and Winter (1988) suggests that exporters can afford to pass-through appreciations and
absorb depreciations if they are able to strategically switch between foreign and domestic sources
of production inputs and to alter the type of production technology. However, since technology
switching (even at no cost) takes time to be implemented and contracts with input providers
are likely to have fixed terms, this mechanism is hard to reconcile with short-run asymmetries.
Our paper is also related to an empirical literature about directional (or sign) asymmetry
in import ERPT. This literature is still rather sparse. Most empirical models accommodate
only short-run directional asymmetry and focus exclusively on a single country or a very small
cross-section of countries. To mention a few, Herzberg et al. (2003) analyses the UK from 1975
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to 2001, Marazzi et al. (2005) and Pollard and Coughlin (2004) work with US data covering the
1983-2004 and 1978-2000 periods, respectively, and Bussie`re (2013) examines the G7 economies
from 1980 to 2006. The findings of these studies are mixed. Herzberg et al. cannot refute
the hypothesis of symmetric short-run import ERPT, while Pollard and Coughlin document
short-run sign asymmetry for about half of 30 US industries but the direction is ambiguous. By
contrast, Bussie`re finds that depreciations tend to be passed more strongly than appreciations
in the short-run. To the best of our knowledge, Webber (2000) is the only study of long-run
directional asymmetry in import ERPT. By estimating a cointegrated vector autoregressive
model that focuses on long-run asymmetry, Webber finds that depreciations are passed-through
more strongly than appreciations for a group of eight Asian economies. In the context of overall
ERPT into CPI, Delatte and Lopez-Villavicencio (2012) reach a similar conclusion based on
NARDL models estimated for Germany, Japan, the UK and the US.
Our exploration of the factors determining the extent of long-run asymmetry in import ERPT
builds on the existing literature which investigates the main drivers of the strength of ERPT.
Several studies have shown that ERPT is stronger for large exchange rate changes, a kind of
nonlinear response typically associated with menu costs (Pollard and Coughlin, 2004; Posedel
and Tica, 2009; Przystupa and Wrobel, 2011; Ben Cheikh, 2012; Bussie`re, 2013). Macroeconomic
risk has also been identified as a factor influencing ERPT. Using US data from 1969–1999, Taylor
(2000) shows that the strength of ERPT is constrained by a low level and volatility of inflation.
He provides an elegant theoretical explanation based on the link between pricing power and
the persistence of costs and other firms’ price changes. Supporting empirical evidence has been
provided by Choudhri and Hakura (2006). A raft of other macrofinancial factors have also
been considered in the literature for their role in determining the strength ERPT, including the
output gap, output growth and emerging market bond spreads, among others (e.g. Chew et al.,
2011; Nogueira and Leon-Ledesma, 2011; Brun-Aguerre et al., 2012; Mallick and Marques, 2013;
Ben Cheikh and Rault, 2014).
Finally, our finding that the long-run asymmetry in import ERPT does not differ significantly
between DMs and EMs challenges some of the historical explanations of the fear of floating
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). However, ours is not the first paper to do so. A substantial body
of research challenges the received wisdom that exporters treat EMs less favourably than DMs
in terms of ERPT (e.g., Bussie`re and Peltonen, 2008; Brun-Aguerre et al., 2012; Choudhri and
Hakura, 2015). Based on a large sample of 13 DMs and 28 EMs over the period 1980–2006,
Bussie`re and Peltonen show that the short-run exchange rate elasticity of import prices is not
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higher among EMs than DMs. Similarly, Brun-Aguerre et al. challenge the view that import
ERPT has been universally falling in DMs but not in EMs in their analysis of 19 EMs and
18 EMs over the period 1980–2009. Choudhri and Hakura, meanwhile, analyse a sample of 18
DMs and 16 EMs over the period 1979–2010 and show that average import ERPT over short-
and long-run horizons is comparable for both groups. Similar results have been established in
the context of overall ERPT into CPI by Choudhri and Hakura (2006), Ca’Zorzi et al. (2007),
Mihaljek and Klau (2008), Kohlscheen (2010) and Frankel et al. (2012).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and Section 3
explains the methodology. The empirical results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Further details of the dataset and methodology are provided in the Appendices and in a separate
online data supplement.
2 Data Description
Our analysis is based on a comprehensive unbalanced panel data set covering N = 33 importing
economies over a maximum sample period of 1980Q1 to 2010Q4. The Economist classifies 14
of the economies that we consider as EMs and 19 as DMs. The countries are: Argentina†,
Australia, Belgium/Luxembourg, Brazil†, Canada, Chile†, China†, Colombia†, Czech Republic†,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong†, Hungary†, Ireland, Israel†, Italy,
Japan, Korea†, Mexico†, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Singapore†, South Africa†, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand†, the UK, and the US, where each EM is identified by a dagger
symbol. Collectively, these countries accounted for 69% of world imports in 2010, with 48% due
to the DMs and 21% to the EMs.
Our analysis unfolds in three stages. First, for each country i = 1, 2, . . . , N , we estimate the
elasticity of import prices to exchange rate changes (hereafter, the ERPT elasticity). In order
to test for asymmetric ERPT, we adopt the NARDL framework developed by Shin et al. (2014).
This framework allows the import price to respond dfferently to appreciations and depreciations
over various horizons: on impact, in the short-run and in the long-run. The NARDL model
for the ith country is estimated using time-series data on the import price, export price and
exchange rate for that country. The import price, Pi,t, is an index capturing the domestic
price of imported goods and services at the dock. The export price P ∗i,t, is an effective index
that measures the foreign price of goods and services traded into country i from the rest of
the world. We compute this index as a relative trade-weighted average of export price indices,
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P ∗i,t =
∑J(i)
j=1 w
j
i,tP
j∗
t where j = 1, ..., J(i) are the trading partners of importing country i, and
wji,t is the import share or ratio of the imports in US$ received by country i from country j to its
total imports. Consequently, P ∗i,t measures the ‘rest-of-the-world’ export price faced by country
i. The exchange rate is defined as the local (importer’s) currency price of a unit of foreign
(exporter’s) currency, which we measure as Si,t = 1/NEERi, where NEERi is the nominal
effective exchange rate index of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency. The lower case
notation pit, p
∗
i,t and si,t will henceforth denote the natural log of each variable.
Table 1 summarises the distribution of quarterly log changes, ∆si,t, ∆pi,t and ∆p
∗
i,t, for
each country. Note that the panel is unbalanced with a maximum span of 1980Q1–2010Q4.
In the table, we report summary statistics over the available sample period for each country.
Unsurprisingly, we observe considerably more volatility for EMs than DMs. The largest standard
deviation of ∆si,t among the EMs is 11.75% (Argentina) compared to a much lower value among
the DMs of just 4.54% (Japan). We observe a relatively close correspondence between the
volatility of the exchange rate and the volatility of the import price — indeed, considering
the 33 markets in our sample, the cross-section correlation between the standard deviation of
∆si,t and that of ∆pi,t is 0.85. The two columns labelled ‘depr(+)’ and ‘appr(-)’ in Table 1
record the percentage of the sample quarters in which the domestic currency appreciates and
depreciates, respectively. For the DMs, the proportion of quarterly depreciations ranges from
34% to 65% across countries, while the corresponding range for the EMs is 31% to 61%. Finally,
the table reports results for two well-known unit root tests applied to the logarithmic exchange
rate, import price and export price variables. In the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test the
null hypothesis is unit root behaviour and the alternative hypothesis is stationarity (Dickey and
Fuller, 1979). In the KPSS unit root test of Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), the aforementioned null
and alternative hypotheses are reversed. In conjunction with (unreported) results of the two
tests applied to quarterly log changes, the reported test statistics indicate that the three main
variables in our study (si,t, pi,t and p
∗
i,t) are first–difference stationary.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
In the second stage of our analysis, we employ panel data estimation methods in order to
exploit both the time and cross-section variation in the data. Specifically, we use the Mean
Group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995). To obtain a set of baseline results, we begin by
studying the full panel of N = 33 countries. Subsequently, we group the countries into smaller
subpanels. For example, we obtain separate panel ERPT estimates for the group of 19 DMs and
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for the group of 14 EMs. Testing for the equality of the ERPT estimates associated with these
two groups allows us to investigate whether the extent of import ERPT depends on the level of
economic and financial development of the importing economy.
In the final stage of our analysis, we estimate cross-section regressions to identify the main
forces that drive the directional asymmetry in ERPT. Various fundamentals of the importing
economy such as the level of economic development (DM versus EM), import dependence, FX
volatility, the output gap, GDP per capita and the level and volatility of inflation are natural
candidates. These variables have been used in the existing literature that has sought to explain
variation in the extent of (symmetric) ERPT across countries and/or time periods (e.g. Taylor,
2000; Campa and Goldberg, 2005; Choudhri and Hakura, 2006; Brun-Aguerre et al., 2012).
We consider two additional variables that may drive the directional asymmetry in ERPT.
First, given that the demand for commodities is highly inelastic in the short-run due to habit
formation, sunk costs and the costs associated with technology-switching, international com-
modity markets may be particularly prone to rent-seeking behaviour on the part of exporters.
Specifically, exporters selling to heavily commodity-import dependent markets may elect to
pass-through depreciations more strongly than appreciations. Accordingly, our first additional
variable is a net commodity importer indicator that we construct by regressing quarterly ex-
change rate changes, ∆sit, on a constant and quarterly changes in a broad commodity index,
∆Ct. Three regressions are run per country using the following three commodity indices: (i)
the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index; (ii) the Dow Jones–UBS Commodity Index; and (iii)
the Thomson Reuters/Jefferies CRB Index. For each country, our indicator is constructed by
averaging the slope coefficients from the three regressions — negative (positive) values signify a
commodity currency (net commodity importer). Second, we evaluate the role of trade freedom,
which captures the extent of frictions to international trade introduced by tariff structures, trade
quotas, inefficient and/or corrupt administration and capital controls. To measure trade free-
dom, we use item 4 of the Economic Freedom of the World index compiled by Gwartney et al.
(2012). This is an index bounded between 0 and 10 where higher values signify greater freedom
of trade. Trade liberalisation may encourage stronger market competition which, in turn, im-
poses discipline on exporters’ pricing policies, reducing the scope for opportunistic pass-through
behaviour. A detailed data description including the available time span for each variable and
the data sources that we have consulted is available online via the journal website.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Country Pass-Through Models
For each country in our sample, the time dimension is sufficient to allow us to estimate sepa-
rate time-series models, thereby accommodating full heterogeneity across countries in the pass-
through estimates. We adopt the NARDL modelling framework of Shin et al. (2014) which
requires the following partial sum decomposition of the log of the effective exchange rate
s+i,t =
t∑
j=1
∆s+i,j =
t∑
j=1
max (∆si,j , 0) , s
−
i,t =
t∑
j=1
∆s−i,j =
t∑
j=1
min (∆si,j , 0) , (3.1)
where si,t ≡ si,0 + s+i,t + s−i,t. These partial sum processes effectively separate domestic currency
depreciations (s+i,t) and appreciations (s
−
i,t). The initial value, si,0, can be set to zero without
loss of generality. A sign asymmetric long-run ERPT relationship can be formalised as
pi,t = β
+
i s
+
i,t + β
−
i s
−
i,t + γip
∗
i,t + ui,t, (3.2)
where β+i , β
−
i and γi are unknown long-run parameters to be estimated. Note that this asym-
metric long-run relationship reduces the familiar symmetric form if β+i =β
−
i . Equation (3.2) can
be re-written as ui,t = pi,t − pei,t where pei,t ≡ β+i s+i,t + β−i s−i,t + γip∗i,t is the equilibrium path of
the import price for country i conditional on the exchange rate and export price levels. When
written in this form, it is clear that the stationary zero-mean error process, ui,t, represents the
deviations of country i’s import price from its long-run equilibrium path. Following Shin et
al. (2014), embedding (3.2) within an ARDL(p, q, r) model yields the following NARDL(p, q, r)
model for the aggregate import price change faced by country i at time t
∆pi,t = αi + ρipi,t−1 + θ+i s
+
i,t−1 + θ
−
i s
−
i,t−1 + λip
∗
i,t−1
+
p−1∑
j=1
ϕi,j∆pi,t−j +
q−1∑
j=0
(
pi+i,j∆s
+
i,t−j + pi
−
i,j∆s
−
i,t−j
)
+
r−1∑
j=0
φi,j∆p
∗
i,t−j + εi,t (3.3)
where εi,t ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ2i ). The parameters of interest are the long-run ERPT elasticities given
by β+i = −θ+i /ρi in the case of depreciations and by β−i = −θ−i /ρi in the case of appreciations,
as well as the impact and short-run ERPT elasticities for depreciations and appreciations which
are collected in the vector (pi+i,0, . . . , pi
+
i,q−1, pi
−
i,0, . . . , pi
−
i,q−1)
′.
Equation (3.3) is equivalent to the error correction representation of the conditional model
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given in equation (9.10) of Shin et al. (2014). Following Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Pesaran et
al. (2001), Shin et al. note that the NARDL model provides unbiased estimation and inference for
the long-run parameters even in the presence of weakly endogenous non-stationary explanatory
variables. However, interpretation of the short-run parameters may be compromised by such
endogeneity. Consequently, as with most empirical studies of ERPT in the existing literature, our
analysis is predicated on the premise that changes in the import price do not contemporaneously
affect exchange rates or export prices. This is a mild assumption in the present context due
to the quarterly frequency of our data. Of course, a large rise in import prices may ultimately
increase inflation, potentially prompting a reaction from the monetary authority and impacting
upon the exchange rate. However, this mechanism is unlikely to operate within one quarter, not
least because most central banks refer to year-on-year inflation measures and inflation data is
typically released at relatively low frequency and with a non-negligible delay. Nevertheless, we
stress that no such assumption is required when interpreting the long-run parameters.
The statistical significance of the long-run equilibrium component in (3.3) can be assessed
using the FPSS test statistic of Pesaran et al. (2001) or the tBDM test statistic of Banerjee et al.
(1998). The former is a non-standard F -test of the restriction H0: ρi = θ
+
i = θ
−
i = λi = 0, while
the latter is a non-standard t-test of the single restriction H0: ρi = 0 against the alternative HA:
ρi < 0. For both tests, we employ the critical value bounds tabulated by Pesaran et al. (2001)
which are valid for variables with mixed order of integration. Shin et al. (2014) note that such
flexibility is important in the context of NARDL models given that partial sum decompositions
may exhibit a variety of time-series properties.
The NARDL model (3.3) is well suited to the empirical analysis of pass-through behaviour.
It accommodates heterogenous asymmetries with respect to appreciations and depreciations
over various horizons: on impact, in the short-run and in the long-run. In addition, it nests a
number of simpler pass-through models. For instance, one may impose the restriction β+i = β
−
i ,
which implies that long-run ERPT is symmetric in country i. Similarly, one may impose various
restrictions on the short-run components of the model. For instance, the pairwise restriction
pi+i,j = pi
−
i,j , j = 0, . . . , q − 1 rules out any form of impact or short-run ERPT asymmetry in
country i while the alternative and somewhat weaker additive restriction
∑q−1
j=0 pi
+
i,j =
∑q−1
j=0 pi
−
i,j
implies that the short-run ERPT dynamics for country i are symmetric when evaluated over the
lag structure j = 0, . . . , q− 1. Likewise, one may impose the restriction pi+i,0 = pi−i,0 which implies
that impact ERPT is symmetric with respect to depreciations and appreciations in country i.
A particularly important feature of the NARDL model is that this flexibility does not come at a
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high cost in terms of computational difficulty — in fact, the model is linear-in-parameters and
readily estimable by OLS.
For each economy i = 1, 2, . . . , N , we evaluate several hypotheses relating to different types
of asymmetric ERPT. We begin with the following three hypotheses concerning long-run ERPT:
Hyp. 1 (Zero long-run ERPT for depreciations/appreciations) H1+0 : β
+
i = 0 vs. H
1+
A :
β+i 6= 0 for depreciations; likewise, H1−0 : β−i = 0 vs. H1−A : β−i 6= 0 for appreciations.
Hyp. 2 (Complete long-run ERPT for depreciations/appreciations) H2+0 : β
+
i ≥ 1 vs.
H2+A : β
+
i < 1 for depreciations; likewise, H
2−
0 : β
−
i ≥ 1 vs. H2−A : β1−i < 1 for appreciations.
Hyp. 3 (Symmetric long-run ERPT) H30 : β
+
i = β
−
i vs. H
3
A: β
+
i 6= β−i .
Next, the following three hypotheses are formulated to investigate impact ERPT:
Hyp. 4 (Zero impact ERPT for depreciations/appreciations) H4+0 : pi
+
i,0 = 0 vs. H
4+
A :
pi+i,0 6= 0 for depreciations; likewise, H4−0 : pi−i,0 = 0 vs. H4−A : pi−i,0 6= 0 for appreciations.
Hyp. 5 (Complete impact ERPT for depreciations/appreciations) H5+0 : pi
+
i,0 ≥ 1 vs.
H5+A : pi
+
i,0 < 1 for depreciations; likewise, H
5−
0 : pi
−
i,0 ≥ 1 vs. H5−A : pi−i,0 < 1 for appreciations.
Hyp. 6 (Symmetric impact ERPT) H60 : pi
+
i,0 = pi
−
i,0 vs. H
6
A: pi
+
i,0 6= pi−i,0.
Finally, we consider the following three hypotheses concerning cumulative short-run ERPT:
Hyp. 7 (Zero short-run ERPT for depreciations/appreciations) H7+0 :
∑q−1
j=0 pi
+
i,j = 0
vs. H7+A :
∑q−1
j=0 pi
+
i,j 6= 0 for depreciations; likewise, H7−0 :
∑q−1
j=0 pi
−
i,j = 0 vs. H
7−
A :
∑q−1
j=0 pi
−
i,j 6= 0
for appreciations.
Hyp. 8 (Complete short-run ERPT for depreciations/appreciations) H8+0 :
∑q−1
j=1 pi
+
i,j ≥
1 vs. H8+A :
∑q−1
j=0 pi
+
i,j < 1 for depreciations; likewise, H
8−
0 :
∑q−1
j=0 pi
−
i,j ≥ 1 vs. H8−A :
∑q−1
j=0 pi
−
i,j < 1
for appreciations.
Hyp. 9 (Symmetric short-run ERPT) H90 :
∑q−1
j=0 pi
+
i,j =
∑q−1
j=0 pi
−
i,j vs. the alternative H
9
A:∑q−1
j=0 pi
+
i,j 6=
∑q−1
j=0 pi
−
i,j.
All of these hypotheses will be assessed in our empirical analysis below using standard
asymptotic t tests and Wald tests. In addition, we implement the bootstrap testing procedure
of Shin et al. (2014), which is based on cumulative dynamic multipliers obtained recursively
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from the parameters of the levels representation of (3.3). The cumulative dynamic multipliers
m+i,h and m
−
i,h trace the evolution of the import price over horizons h = 0, 1, . . . ,H in response
to a unit depreciation and appreciation, respectively, of the domestic currency in period h = 0.
Therefore, the linear combination m+i,h − m−i,h measures the ERPT asymmetry at horizon h.
Bootstrap confidence bands around m+i,h −m−i,h can be used to test whether the asymmetry at
horizon h is statistically significant (an overview of the computational details may be found in
Appendix A). This bootstrap approach serves not only to provide robust small-sample inference
on asymmetry in ERPT but also enables one to test for asymmetry at any desired horizon.
3.2 Panel Pass-Through Estimation
By exploiting both the time variation and the cross-section variation in the data, panel estimation
of the ERPT coefficients should yield more precise estimates and more reliable inference than
country-by-country NARDL estimation, which only exploits the time variation in the sample.
The Mean Group (MG) estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995) can be described in the present
context as an equally-weighted average of the country-specific NARDL model estimates. As
such, this panel estimation approach amounts to a flexible random-coefficients formulation of
the NARDL equation (3.3) that allows for full country-heterogeneity in the parameters.
We initially consider a group composed of the full set of available countries (Ng = N = 33).
Subsequently, we form alternative groups by ranking the countries in our sample according to
the economic factors discussed in Section 2. Let us take inflation to illustrate our approach.
We first compute the mean rate of inflation over time for each country in our sample. We then
rank the countries from low to high inflation and, accordingly, define an above-mean or ‘high’
inflation group of countries and a below-mean or ‘low’ inflation group.
Figure 1 shows the country rankings thus obtained, while Appendix B reports the pairwise
cross-sectional correlations among the different economic variables. The rankings confirm sev-
eral stylised facts. For example, Argentina and Brazil exhibit high inflation and FX volatility,
while Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries enjoy the highest GDP per capita. Our net
commodity importer indicator successfully separates the commodity currency countries (includ-
ing Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, New Zealand, Norway and South Africa) from the major
net commodity importers (such as China, Hong Kong, Japan and the US).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
For the gth group which contains Ng ≤ N countries, the MG estimator is computed as fol-
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lows. Let Θˆi denote the vector of estimated NARDL coefficients for country i = 1, ..., Ng.
The MG estimator is defined as Θ¯
MG ≡ 1Ng
∑Ng
i=1 Θˆi with covariance matrix V (Θ¯
MG
) ≡
1
Ng(Ng−1)
∑Ng
i=1(Θˆi − Θ¯MG)(Θˆj − Θ¯MG)′. It is worth noting that the MG approach presumes
that the long-run parameters of interest are E(−θ+/ρ) and E(−θ−/ρ) instead of E(−θ+)/E(ρ)
and E(−θ−)/E(ρ). For a more detailed discussion, see Pesaran and Smith (1995). Based on
the MG estimator, we are able to test Hypotheses 1 to 9 at the group level using standard
asymptotic tests. We also compute asymmetric cumulative dynamic multipliers at the group
level for depreciations and appreciations at horizons h = 0, 1, ...,H and apply Shin et al.’s (2014)
bootstrap procedure to test for asymmetry, as explained in Appendix A.
Lastly, for robustness, we also employ Swamy’s (1970) random coefficients estimator which
weights the country-specific parameter estimates according to their precision. However, in prac-
tice, the covariance matrix of the Swamy estimator is not positive definite for some country
groupings in which case we follow Swamy’s suggestion and replace it with the MG covariance
matrix. The results are qualitatively similar using both the MG and Swamy estimators so we
only present the former here to conserve space.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Country-by-Country Results
According to the law of one price for traded goods, the existence of a long-run equilibrium
relationship among the import price (pit), the export price (p
∗
it) and the exchange rate (sit) for
the ith country prevents them from drifting apart over prolonged periods. The cointegration test
results shown in Table 2 provide strong evidence in favour of cointegration and, therefore, also
support the established practice of employing error correction models to study ERPT behaviour
(e.g., Banerjee et al., 2008; Brun-Aguerre et al., 2012; Campa et al., 2008; Delatte and Lopez-
Villavicencio, 2012). For most countries, one or both of the tBDM and FPSS tests applied to
the general NARDL model (3.3) rejects the null hypothesis of no long-run equilibrium. The
evidence changes somewhat when one fits a more restrictive specification which imposes long-
run and/or short-run symmetric ERPT. An important example is the US, where the FPSS test
provides strong evidence in favour of asymmetric cointegration under the general NARDL model
but yields no evidence of linear cointegration in the nested model where one imposes long-run
symmetry. This reflects Shin et al.’s (2014) observation that, if the true unobserved long-run
relationship is asymmetric, then failure to recognise this asymmetry in an empirical model is
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likely to confound efforts to test for the existence of a long-run equilibrium path.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The estimation results of the NARDL model (3.3) for each country in our sample are reported
in Table 3. We adopt the lag structure p = q = r = 2 for all countries since it is generally
sufficient to whiten the residuals. There are just two cases (Hungary and Chile) in which the
Ljung-Box portmanteau test indicates residual autocorrelation with this lag structure. However,
the use of Newey-West robust standard errors does not materially change the significance of the
ERPT coefficients in either case. Consequently, we rely on OLS standard errors for all countries.
The NARDL(2,2,2) model fits the data reasonably well as reflected by the degrees-of-freedom
adjusted explanatory power, R¯2, which ranges from 0.428 (Singapore) to 0.914 (Mexico) for
EMs, and from 0.274 (Spain) to 0.786 (Australia) for DMs.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Our results indicate that long-run ERPT is asymmetric in 18 countries (11 DMs and 7
EMs). For all but one of them, the long-run ERPT with respect to depreciations exceeds
that for appreciations, i.e. βˆ+i > βˆ
−
i . The null hypothesis of complete long-run depreciation
pass-through is not rejected for 19 DMs and 9 EMs, while the equivalent values in the case
of appreciations are 10 and 8, respectively. This asymmetry suggests that, in the long-run,
exporters may be reluctant or unable to absorb adverse exchange rate fluctuations (depreciations
of the importer’s currency) within their operating margins. One plausible explanation is that
exporters exercise pricing power by choosing to pass depreciations through to import prices
(thus keeping margins constant) while profiting from appreciations by keeping import prices
constant (thus increasing their markups). Such behaviour could only be sustained in the long-
run in the presence of imperfect competition among exporters, which may arise if firms can
maintain product differentiation by means of innovation, quality enhancements or technological
progress. Alternatively, our results could reflect either tacit or explicit price collusion among
exporters regarding their response to exchange rate fluctuations or an ability to exploit import
dependence.
Turning to the impact ERPT, we observe asymmetry for 12 countries with no obvious dis-
tinction between developed and emerging markets: 4 DMs and 3 EMs show stronger impact
ERPT for depreciations than appreciations while 2 DMs and 3 EMs show the reverse pattern.
Our tests do not reject the null hypothesis of zero impact ERPT to import prices in the US
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with respect to depreciations. This suggests that exporters may treat US importers relatively
favourably, a finding which is consistent with several previous studies including Campa and
Goldberg (2005) and Marazzi et al. (2005). We observe complete impact ERPT for less than
half of the total cross-section of countries. Depreciations are fully passed-through on impact for
6 DMs and 8 EMs, while 7 DMs and 6 EMs exhibit complete impact ERPT for appreciations.
Finally, the null hypothesis of zero cumulative short-run ERPT can be rejected for 11 EMs
and 14 DMs in the case of depreciations and for 11 EMs and 16 DMs in the case of appreciations.
We find evidence of cumulative short-run ERPT asymmetry for 10 countries in total, with no
clear distinction between developed and emerging economies: 2 DMs and 2 EMs show stronger
short-run ERPT for depreciations, while 3 DMs and 3 EMs show asymmetry in the opposite
direction. The depreciation (appreciation) ERPT is statistically insignificant (significant) both
on impact and in the short-run for the US. This is a natural finding, as one would expect to
observe pricing-to-market in a country as important as the US
Figures 2 and 3 plot the cumulative dynamic multipliers associated with a unit depreciation
(m+i,h) and appreciation (m
−
i,h) of the exchange rate on a country-by-country basis. The linear
combination m+i,h − m−i,h, h = 0, 1, ...,H is shown together with its 90% bootstrap confidence
band. Comparing the dynamic multipliers across countries reveals a general pattern. In many
cases, we observe m+i,h − m−i,h > 0 for horizons of roughly 8 quarters or more, reflecting our
earlier observation that long-run ERPT for depreciations typically exceeds that for appreciations.
Meanwhile, evidence of short-run asymmetry is far less common across countries and, where it
is observed, its direction is considerably more mixed.
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here]
In several cases, the evolution of m+i,h − m−i,h shows an initial overshooting followed by a
reversal — depreciations are passed through less strongly than appreciations in the immediate
short-run before the pass-through of depreciations gradually strengthens as time passes. Coun-
tries in which this pattern is observed include Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and the
US. This group includes some of the most lucrative export markets in the world, which are
populated with well-informed and aﬄuent agents that enjoy considerable freedom to trade. In
such favourable markets, exporters may exhibit a greater willingness to absorb adverse exchange
rate fluctuations into their markups in the short-run in order to preserve or gain market share.
Cases where asymmetric pass-through is confined to the long-run include many DMs (e.g.,
Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K.) as well as South
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Korea which is among the most developed of the EMs. Most of these economies are wealthy, rel-
atively small and with well-established import markets. By contrast, we find that depreciations
are passed-through to import prices more strongly than appreciations over both the short- and
long-run for countries such as Argentina, China, Greece, Israel and Thailand. Many of these
markets suffer from weak institutions and are subject to a variety of restrictive trade regulations.
Exporters selling in these countries may thus face a relatively low degree of competition and may
perceive few obstacles to their pursuit of short-run rent-seeking ERPT strategies. A final set of
countries including Chile, Colombia, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand and
South Africa exhibit roughly symmetric pass-through both in the short- and long-run. Members
of this group are generally either net commodity exporters or re-export locations.
4.2 Panel Results
Table 4 reports panel ERPT coefficients and hypothesis tests for an array of country groups,
as described in Section 3.2 and in Figure 1. The corresponding cumulative dynamic multipliers
are plotted in Figure 4. A result that resonates across country groups is that depreciation
ERPT is generally complete and significantly stronger than appreciation ERPT in the long-run.
This suggests that, over long horizons and in the aggregate, exporters are keen to appropriate
appreciations by widening their margins and keeping the import price unchanged. By contrast,
they tend to pass depreciations onto their customers, leading to a rise in import prices.
[Table 4 and Figure 4 around here]
Analysing the long-run ERPT elasticities, we find little difference across country groups. For
instance, t-tests between groups reported in Table 4 suggest no distinction between the long-run
ERPT elasticities of high versus low inflation economies, or high versus low per capita GDP
economies. This is also apparent in the cumulative dynamic multipliers shown in Figure 4. The
only statistically significant difference that we uncover (and only at the 10% level) arises in the
case of high versus low FX volatility countries — stronger depreciation ERPT comes hand-in-
hand with lower FX volatility. This is broadly consistent with the evidence in Devereux and
Engel (2002) which links high FX volatility and local currency pricing (or low ERPT).
The panel estimation results in Table 4 reveal some evidence of impact asymmetry but no
evidence of short-run cumulative asymmetry for any of the country groups considered. Where
impact asymmetry is significant, the contemporaneous effect of a depreciation on import prices
exceeds that of an appreciation (i.e. pi+ − pi− > 0), a pattern which is again suggestive of weak
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competition. This occurs in three groups which include low GDP per capita countries, countries
that on average experience large FX changes, and countries with low inflation.
To sum up, both the country-by-country NARDL analysis and the panel analysis suggest that
depreciations are passed-through more vigorously than appreciations in the long-run. To date,
however, the majority of existing studies have modelled the long-run equilibrium relationship
between exchange rates, import prices and export prices as symmetric.
4.3 Determinants of Long-Run Asymmetric Pass-Through
We now seek to explain the cross-section variation in long-run ERPT asymmetry by regressing
the estimated long-run ERPT asymmetry measure L̂R
asy
i ≡ βˆ+i − βˆ−i on various fundamentals
of the importing country. L̂R
asy
i is positive in 27 out of 33 countries. Consequently, we interpret
a positive slope coefficient for a given regressor as evidence that a marginal increase in its value
will cause exporters to exercise greater pricing power by increasing the extent to which they
pass-through depreciations more strongly than appreciations. Table 5 reports the results.
[Table 5 around here]
Section A of the table provides baseline univariate regression results. Although one must
remain cognisant of the risk of omitted variable bias in such simple specifications, it appears that
import dependence is the most prominent factor driving the directional ERPT asymmetry —
greater import dependence magnifies the extent of long-run ERPT asymmetry. The multivariate
regressions reported in Section B of the table confirm the central role of import dependence in
explaining cross-country variation in ERPT asymmetry. Furthermore, to ensure that the poten-
tial endogeneity of the rate of inflation and/or its volatility does not contaminate our results,
we report an additional multivariate regression excluding both of these regressors. Such endo-
geneity may arise if, for example, asymmetric ERPT favouring depreciations over appreciations
influences the general price level and thereby impacts upon both the rate of inflation and its
volatility. Our main results are robust to this model re-specification.
The role of import dependence as a driver of long-run ERPT asymmetry has a clear the-
oretical rationale. Import dependence is a good proxy for import penetration which, in turn,
measures the degree of competition that exporters face from domestic firms. Higher import
penetration means lower domestic competition faced by foreign firms. Consequently, our evi-
dence that the higher the import dependence, the greater the extent to which depreciations are
passed-through relative to appreciations can be viewed as an extension of the finding by An
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and Wang (2011) that countries with a higher import share tend to experience stronger import
ERPT. Indeed, An and Wang’s baseline result is also apparent in the panel estimation results
that we report in Table 4 — the mean of βˆ+ and βˆ− for the high import dependence group is
0.83 while it is just 0.77 for the low import dependence group.
In order to further explore the role of import dependence, we estimate a nonlinear regression
where import dependence is interacted with all of the other economic factors that we consider.
The results, shown in Section C of Table 5, reveal that the positive association between import
dependence and long-run ERPT asymmetry is moderated by increases in the importing econ-
omy’s freedom to trade. This is consistent with the empirical results documented by Kohlscheen
(2010) and with the predictions from several well-known theoretical models (e.g. Dornbusch,
1987; Gust et al., 2010; Kleshchelski and Vincent, 2009). For example, the model proposed by
Dornbusch suggests that exporters exercise less pricing power in markets where the degree of
competition is strong. Given that open trade policies allow both domestic and exporting firms to
contest the local market, it follows that greater trade freedom should lead to more intense com-
petition. Similarly, Gust et al. develop an open-economy dynamic general equilibrium model
where factors that lead to greater trade integration — such as lower per-unit trade costs —
improve the relative competitiveness of a foreign exporter in the domestic market, allowing the
exporter to increase its markup over costs. As its markup increases, the foreign firm finds it
optimal to vary its markup more and its price less in response to exchange rate movements.
The output gap also moderates the extent of the directional long-run ERPT asymmetry.
This may reflect opportunistic behaviour by exporters, where they exhibit a higher willingness
to quote competitive prices and gain market share in countries which are at a favourable stage
of their business cycle. This finding is consistent with the evidence provided by Chew et al.
(2011) based on standard linear pass-through models allowing for business cycle effects, which
suggest that exporters strategically adopt lenient pricing strategies when the importing econ-
omy is growing above potential. Finally, these cross-sectional regressions confirm our previous
finding that EMs and DMs do not differ significantly in terms of the extent of long-run ERPT
asymmetry.
5 Summary and Policy Implications
A thorough understanding of the extent and nature of ERPT into import prices is central to the
analysis of global trade imbalances, the conduct of monetary policy, and the appropriate choice
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of exchange rate regime. Although the literature on the subject is ample, no existing study
has investigated sign asymmetry in the response of import prices to exchange rate changes over
various horizons (impact, short-run and long-run) for a large sample that includes both developed
and emerging economies. In this paper, we have sought to fill this gap in the literature.
We find that long-run ERPT is generally stronger for depreciations than appreciations, a
pattern that is consistent with rent-seeking behaviour by exporting firms. Exporters exercise
pricing power by passing depreciations through to import prices while preserving their markups,
and by keeping import prices constant following appreciations while their markups increase. The
extent of the asymmetry increases with the import dependence of the destination market but is
moderated if the importer enjoys greater freedom-to-trade and/or a more positive output gap.
These findings suggest that weak competition structures in international trade allow exporters
to appropriate rents by exploiting exchange rate fluctuations. Not only is this likely to be
welfare-reducing for consumers but it also induces an upward skew in the response of import
prices to exchange rate fluctuations which translates into downward nominal price rigidity and
may hinder the conduct of inflation-targeting monetary policy.
Our results raise concerns about exporters’ market concentration and pricing-to-market be-
haviour, issues that are difficult to regulate in a multi-jurisdictional environment. However, an
important policy implication from our analysis is that trade liberalisation may be an effective
tool to mitigate opportunistic asymmetric ERPT behaviour. Furthermore, our results indicate
that the extent of asymmetric ERPT does not differ between developed and emerging economies,
which provides indirect evidence that the fear of floating of many emerging economies may be
unwarranted from an import price perspective. This being the case, by allowing their exchange
rates to float and by relaxing trade barriers, policymakers in emerging economies may gain
greater freedom to conduct policy in accordance with domestic stabilisation goals.
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APPENDIX A: Bootstrap Confidence Bands for Multipliers
The cumulative dynamic multipliers and the associated non-parametric bootstrap intervals plot-
ted in Figures 2 and 3 are computed as follows:
1. Estimate the NARDL model (3.3) for country i by OLS to obtain the regression residuals,
ˆi,t, t = 1, ..., Ti and the vector of parameter estimates, Θ̂i, from which the cumulative
dynamic multipliers m+i,h and m
−
i,h are computed. Note that the sample length for country
i is denoted Ti to reflect the differences in the estimation samples across countries detailed
in Table 1.
2. Resample from ˆi,t with replacement and denote the vector of resampled residuals for
country i by ˆ
(b)
i,t , t = 1, ..., Ti.
3. Generate the bootstrap sample for country i, ∆p
(b)
i,t , t = 1, ..., Ti, by recursion as follows,
taking the explanatory variables as given:
∆p
(b)
i,t = α̂i + ρ̂ip
(b)
i,t−1 + θ̂
+
i s
+
i,t−1 + θ̂
−
i s
−
i,t−1 + λ̂ip
∗
i,t−1
+
p−1∑
j=1
ϕ̂i,j∆p
(b)
i,t−j +
q−1∑
j=0
(
pi+i,j∆s
+
i,t−j + pi
−
i,j∆s
−
i,t−j
)
+
r−1∑
j=0
φ̂i,j∆p
∗
i,t−j + ε̂
(b)
i,t
4. Re-estimate the NARDL model for country i using the bootstrap sample ∆p
(b)
i,t to obtain
the bootstrap parameter vector, Θ̂
(b)
i .
5. Compute the cumulative dynamic multipliers for country i using the bootstrap parameter
vector.
6. Repeat steps 2–5 B times and compute empirical confidence intervals of any desired width
around the cumulative dynamic multipliers obtained at step 1 in the usual way. Repeat
the process for all countries i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
The panel cumulative dynamic multipliers and the associated confidence bands plotted in Figure
4 can be computed as follows:1
7. Compute the mean of the N country-specific pass-through parameter estimates Θ¯ from
which the panel dynamic multipliers can be obtained.
8. Note that steps 2–4 have already been carried out B times for the full set of countries
i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Now, for each bootstrap sample, b = 1, 2, . . . , B, compute the mean of the
N country-specific bootstrap coefficient vectors, Θ¯
(b)
.
9. Compute the cumulative dynamic multipliers for each of the B bootstrap MG parameter
vectors, Θ¯
(b)
, and then compute empirical confidence intervals of any desired width around
the MG cumulative dynamic multipliers obtained at step 7 in the usual way.
1Here we discuss the simple case in which the MG estimator averages over the NARDL parameter estimates
for all countries in the sample. Generalisation to the case where one averages over a subset of the countries follows
easily.
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APPENDIX B: Pairwise Correlations between the Country Drivers
Emerging Import FX rate Output gap GDP Commodity Trade Size Inflation Inflation
dependence volatility per capita importer freedom FX change rate volatility
Emerging 1.000
Import -0.248 1.000
dependence (0.164)
FX rate 0.330 0.102 1.000
volatility (0.061) (0.571)
Output gap -0.649 0.208 -0.248 1.000
(0.000) (0.247) (0.165)
GDP -0.799 0.017 -0.404 0.580 1.000
per capita (0.000) (0.927) (0.020) (0.000)
Commodity -0.310 -0.090 -0.776 0.135 0.344 1.000
importer (0.079) (0.618) (0.000) (0.454) (0.050)
Trade -0.449 -0.153 -0.536 0.407 0.604 0.351 1.000
freedom (0.009) (0.395) (0.001) (0.019) (0.000) (0.045)
Size FX 0.406 -0.044 0.610 -0.413 -0.464 -0.604 -0.466 1.000
change (0.019) (0.807) (0.000) (0.017) (0.006) (0.000) (0.006)
Inflation 0.494 0.186 0.629 -0.350 -0.600 -0.658 -0.576 0.669 1.000
rate (0.004) (0.300) (0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Inflation 0.608 -0.139 0.379 -0.594 -0.525 -0.271 -0.384 0.719 0.656 1.000
volatility (0.000) (0.439) (0.030) (0.000) (0.002) (0.127) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: For each pair of drivers xA and xB , the figures reported represent the estimated correlation ρA,B = corr(xA,i, xB,i)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , 33 where xA,i and xB,i represent the time average (mean) of drivers xA and xB for the ith country. p-values
are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2: Cointegration Test Results
Unrestricted NARDL Restricted NARDL models
SR & LR asymm. SR symmetry LR symmetry SR & LR symm.
Countries BDM test PSS test BDM test PSS test BDM test PSS test BDM test PSS test
Emerging markets (N=14)
Argentina -3.505 * 3.936 -3.127 6.165 ** -1.547 1.801 -1.446 5.192 **
Brazil -4.865 *** 7.398 *** -5.223 *** 8.280 *** -5.137 *** 8.944 *** -5.409 *** 10.018 ***
Chile -4.076 ** 4.815 * -3.997 ** 4.215 * -4.147 *** 6.457 *** -4.037 ** 5.729 **
China -2.173 3.533 -2.259 3.314 -0.729 3.118 -1.181 3.115
Colombia -1.400 2.693 -1.265 3.053 -1.968 3.625 -1.986 4.073
Czech Rep. -2.765 2.332 -3.016 3.019 -2.775 3.039 -2.842 3.135
Hong Kong -1.475 5.346 ** -2.007 4.003 -2.004 7.183 *** -2.454 5.432 **
Hungary -3.171 4.899 ** -2.776 4.141 * -3.131 4.852 ** -2.736 3.933
Israel -2.963 2.853 -2.882 2.683 -2.388 2.705 -2.412 2.656
Mexico -1.230 4.406 * -1.217 4.581 * -1.017 5.749 ** -1.016 5.994 **
Singapore -2.942 3.424 -2.702 2.711 -2.951 4.565 * -2.885 3.553
South Africa -1.985 1.752 -1.915 1.695 -1.981 2.144 -1.903 2.051
South Korea -4.079 ** 4.446 * -4.163 *** 5.130 ** -1.917 1.541 -1.792 1.908
Thailand -3.159 2.655 -2.998 2.292 -1.417 0.785 -1.522 0.820
Developed markets (N=19)
Australia -2.147 2.700 -2.143 2.754 -1.328 2.548 -1.273 2.584
Belgium -1.939 1.651 -1.931 1.644 0.205 0.365 0.140 0.454
Canada -4.468 *** 6.034 ** -4.234 *** 5.764 ** -3.429 * 5.161 ** -3.404 * 5.418 **
Denmark -4.030 ** 5.438 ** -4.600 *** 7.615 *** -2.778 4.174 * -3.612 ** 6.670 ***
Finland -3.500 * 3.275 -3.382 * 3.225 -2.562 2.459 -2.151 1.971
France -3.630 ** 5.063 ** -3.670 ** 4.974 ** -4.110 *** 6.493 *** -4.160 *** 6.359 **
Germany -1.973 3.578 -2.088 3.762 -1.977 4.807 * -2.134 5.041 **
Greece -3.625 ** 7.523 *** -2.360 5.310 ** -2.225 6.942 *** -1.953 6.272 **
Ireland -3.253 * 4.223 * -3.292 * 4.325 * -3.767 ** 5.648 ** -3.800 ** 5.779 **
Italy -3.441 * 4.088 -3.309 * 3.903 -3.552 ** 5.476 ** -3.437 * 5.241 **
Japan -4.316 *** 4.890 ** -4.151 *** 4.522 * -4.400 *** 6.579 *** -4.043 ** 5.725 **
Netherlands -2.990 4.246 * -3.031 4.429 * -2.956 5.587 ** -3.009 5.833 **
New Zealand -3.361 * 4.288 * -3.223 * 4.305 * -3.366 * 5.733 ** -3.207 5.637 **
Norway -2.469 2.499 -2.386 2.397 -1.923 2.309 -1.925 2.386
Spain -3.568 ** 4.381 * -3.550 ** 4.429 * -4.056 ** 5.609 ** -4.096 ** 5.723 **
Sweden -2.311 2.900 -2.444 2.755 -1.684 2.973 -1.735 2.635
Switzerland -3.167 3.628 -3.187 3.702 -2.961 3.464 -2.967 3.316
U.K. -3.422 * 5.179 ** -3.287 * 5.642 ** -3.822 ** 5.678 ** -3.984 ** 6.492 ***
U.S. -3.088 5.132 ** -3.005 4.513 * -0.388 2.713 -0.468 2.290
Notes: PSS denotes the Pesaran et al. (2001) F -test of the null hypothesis ρ = β+ = β− = θ = 0 against the alternative
of joint significance. BDM denotes the Banerjee et al. (1998) t-test of the null hypothesis ρ = 0 against the one-sided
alternative ρ < 0. In both cases, the null hypothesis indicates the absence of a long-run levels relationship. The relevant
critical values tabulated by Pesaran et al. for the BDM t-test are -3.21 (10%), -3.53 (5%) and -4.10 (1%). The equivalent
values for the PSS F -test are 4.14 (10%), 4.85 (5%) and 6.36 (1%). ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote rejection of the null at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
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